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IV

INTRODUCTION
In its brief, Counterclaim Defendant and Appellee High-Country Estates
Homeowners Association ("the Association") desperately attempts to explain why the
Well Lease does not or cannot mean what it plainly says, despite the undeniable fact that
its validity has been affirmed by the trial court, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court.
The trial court, after hearing all of the evidence presented at trial and carefully
considering the Association's arguments, correctly concluded that the Well Lease was
neither unconscionable nor violative of any public policy. The trial court's decision is
supported by overwhelming evidence and is therefore not erroneous. This Court should
accordingly preclude the Association from continuing to deprive the Dansies of their
right to water as explicitly set forth in the Well Lease.
Likewise, the trial court acted well within its discretion in awarding the Dansies
judgment in the amount of $16,334.99 for improvements made to the Association's
Water System.

This judgment was based on sound evidence and authority that

unequivocally demonstrates its reasonableness.
Unfortunately, however, the trial court's Order is not free of error, as it
erroneously concluded that the Well Lease requires the Dansies to obtain water only upon
payment of their pro rata transportation fee, despite the undeniable fact that the Well
Lease expressly provides otherwise. This conclusion is neither supported nor justified by
the Orders of the Public Service Commission and the Utah Supreme Court. Quite to the
contrary, it is undisputed that the Water System was decertified as a public utility in
1996, rendering any Public Service Commission Order relied on the by trial court for its
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Order irrelevant. Likewise, enforcing the terms of the Well Lease will not subject the
Water System to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, as such enforcement
would simply add the Dansies to the list of users and nonmembers pursuant to specific
contracts, a category of users recognized by the Public Service Commission as not
violative of any exemption status.
Because the trial court erred in holding that, as a prerequisite to obtaining water
pursuant to the specific terms of the Well Lease, the Dansies must first pay their pro rata
share of the transportation costs, the Association breached the Well Lease by severing the
two Water Systems. The Association does not dispute that it severed the Water System.
Rather, it would have this Court believe that its actions resulted in no damages to the
Dansies. Such argument belies credulity. Certainly severing the Water System caused
damages to the Dansies.

The Association simply disputes the amount of damages

sustained, and the Dansies' actions in response. However, the Association's argument is
without merit, as there is ample evidence in the record of the Dansies' damages resulting
from the Association's actions in severing the Water System. Likewise, contrary to the
Association's argument, such damages were certainly foreseeable at the time the Well
Lease was executed and the Dansies' actions in constructing a temporary water system
satisfied their duty to mitigate. The Association's arguments are therefore not well taken.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE WELL
LEASE IS NEITHER UNCONSCIONABLE NOR VIOLATIVE OF ANY
PUBLIC POLICY.
In its January 5, 2006 Order, the trial court correctly concluded that "[t]he Well

Lease is not void as against public policy. Specifically, the Well Lease is not void based
on Utah Code Ann. §§54-3-8(1) and 54-3-1, the PSC's 1986 Order, or the
unconscionability doctrine." R. at 001766. The Association's arguments to the contrary
are without merit.
Utah law provides parties with substantial latitude to contract freely:
With a few exceptions, it is still axiomatic in contract law that
"persons dealing at arms' length are entitled to contract on
their own terms without the intervention of the Courts for the
purpose of relieving one side or the other from the effects of a
bad bargain. Parties 'should be permitted to enter into
contracts that actually may be unreasonable or which may
lead to hardship on one side.' 'Although courts will not be
parties to enforcing fragrantly unjust agreements, it is not for
the courts to assume the paternalistic role of declaring that
one who has freely bound himself not perform because the
bargain is not favorable.
Bekins Bar VRanch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983) (internal citations omitted).
In order for a contract to be voided as unconscionable, a court must find that "no decent,
fair-minded person would view the ensuing results without being possessed of a profound
sense of injustice." Resource Management Co. v. Westin Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc.,
706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). Likewise, for a contract provision to be considered
unenforceable or void as against public policy expressed in a statutory provision, a court
"must determine (1) what the terms of the contract are; (2) what the statute prohibits; and
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(3) whether the statute or public policy demands that the contract be deemed
unenforceable." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^f 27.
The Association contends that the trial court erred, and that the Well Lease is void
because it is unconscionable and violates the public policy of certain utility regulations
set forth in Utah Code Ann. Title 54, Article XI of the Utah Constitution, and the 1986
Order of the Public Service Commission ("1986 Order"). Each argument lacks merit. As
set forth below, the trial court correctly concluded that (1) the evidence presented at trial
demonstrated that the Well Lease was reasonable, provided substantial benefits to the
Association and is therefore not unconscionable; (2) the Water System is not a public
utility and the provisions of Title 54 are therefore inapplicable; and (3) the PSC had no
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the Well Lease and its findings. Furthermore,
this Court has already determined that the Well Lease does not violate public policy.
Accordingly, the trial court's decision upholding the validity of the Well Lease should be
affirmed.
A,

The Well Lease Is Not Unconscionable.

In a vain attempt to avoid its obligations under the Well Lease, the Association
argues that the trial court erred in failing to conclude that the terms of the Well Lease are
unconscionable. For example, the Association argues that it did not need the water from
Dansie Well No. 1, that the Dansies' ten year obligation to lease the well expired long
ago, that the value of the Well Lease to the Dansies was at least $263,607.00, while the
value to the Association customers was $7,000.00, and that the Well Lease requires a
perpetual obligation for subsidized water. Br. of Appellee at p. 33. Thus, the Association
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argues that these terms represent such "a gross imbalance in the obligations and rights
under the Lease, it is unconscionable and should be invalidated " Id

1 he Association's

arguments are not well taken and do not satisfy the strict standards for establishing
unconscionability. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court:
The determination of whether a contract is unconscionable is
usually made with respect to the conditions that existed at the
time the contract was made, and without regard for the
parties' subsequent conduct and dealings. . . . Furthermore,
analysis of the relevant interests to be evaluated may be
promoted
by
distinguishing
between
substantive
considerations, which focus on the terms of the contract and
procedural considerations, which refer to the relative
positions of the parties and circumstances surrounding the
execution of the contract.
Bekins, et al v Huth, et al, 644 P.2d 455, 461. The Bekins Court set forth the factors
that bear on unconscionability:
(1) the use of printed form or boilerplate contracts drawn
skillfully by the party in the strongest economic position, ...
(2) excessive price or interest; (3) phrasing clauses in
language that is incomprehensible to a layman or that divert
his attention from the problems raised by them or the rights
given up through them, (4) an overall imbalance in the
obligations and rights imposed by the bargain, (5)
exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisticated,
uneducated and the illiterate, ... (6) contract terms so onesided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party, ...
and (7) lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation.
Id at 461-462.
The record fails to contain evidence sufficient to support these criteria. As set
forth in the testimony of Rodney Dansie at trial, when the Well Lease was executed in
1977, the Dansie Well offered the only substantial and reliable water source available to
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the Association. The Dansies and the Well Lease thereafter provided that reasonable and
reliable source of water for the Association until the Association chose to remove itself
from the Dansie Well Tr. at 100:12-:24 (Rodney Dansie). Further, the Association spent
thousands of dollars to drill its own alternate well and rework that well in efforts to make
the water supply from that well viable and sufficient for the Association's needs. Tr. at
1012:18-015:22, 1016:17-1024:19 & Trial Exs. 259 & 243. The Well Lease saved the
Association from that substantial expense until the Association voluntarily chose to incur
it.
Likewise, Rodney Dansie and other homeowners testified that the Dansies made
available a Dansie water tank to supplement water storage for the Association's system
and that the Dansies invested tens of thousands of dollars of their own money to repair
and upgrade the Association's water system during the term of the Well Lease. Tr. at
121:14-18 & 209:20-210:16 (Rodney Dansie); 430:15-433:25 (Tyler); Trial Exs. 5 &
176; 479:14-24 (Richard Dansie). While the benefits of the Well Lease became less
visible to the Association in later years, and as other sources of water became more
available to the Association, the evidence demonstrates that the benefits of the Well
Lease in its early years were essential to the Association. Indeed, for many years the
members of the Association enjoyed the benefits of the Well Lease without complaint or
objection.

The record accordingly demonstrates no shocking unfairness that would

support any basis for invalidating the Well Lease as unconscionable.1

1

Jessie Dansie apparently anticipated the possibility that the operators of the Water
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After hearing the evidence and weighing the credibility of the witnesses, the trial
court thus correctly determined that:
There were insufficient facts established at the evidentiary
hearing for the Court to provide a meaningful review of the
unconscionability of the Well Lease. For example, the Court
must view the conditions that existed at the time the Well
Lease was executed without regard for the parties' subsequent
conduct and dealings. Few facts were established about the
conditions that existed at the time the Well Lease was
executed. Furthermore, there were few facts established
regarding the procedural considerations of the Well Lease,
meaning the relative positions of the parties and the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract. The
sliding scale consideration of unconscionability requires this
Court to have more facts to fully consider the Association's
claim.
R. at 1897. Based on the foregoing, the trial court's decision upholding the validity of
the Well Lease should be affirmed.
B.

The Well Lease Does Not Violate The Public Policy In The Utah
Statutes or Constitution.

As correctly determined by the trial court, there is no evidence that any of the
terms of the Well Lease violate any statutory provisions or that the public policy would
demand that such provisions be unenforceable.
Even though the Water System is no longer public, the Association argues that
section 54-3-1 of the Utah Code, which requires public utilities to set "just and
System might establish an alternate supply of water, would sever the lines between the
Dansie well and the water system, and the line to the Dansie properties, leaving the
Dansie family without water, as occurred in this case. To prevent his family from being
left without water, Jessie Dansie provided in the Well Lease that water rights to the
Dansie family would continue even if from another water source. The fact that the
Association has developed an alternate source of water is therefore not a basis for
depriving the Dansies of their contractual rights.
973634 1
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reasonable" charges and fees for its produces and commodities renders the Well Lease
provision entitling the Dansies to 12 million gallons of water per year unenforceable.
The Association further contends that section 54-3-8(1), which prohibits public utilities
from granting "any preference or advantage to any person," "results in a preference to the
Dansies with concomitant disadvantage to the Association's rate payers."

Br. of

Appellee at p. 31. The Association's reliance on Title 54 is misplaced.
First, Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(15)(a) defines a public utility as any "water
corporation" that delivers to "the public generally" or to a corporation that is a public
utility. The Dansies are neither the general public nor a public utility. Rather, the Water
System ceased to be a public utility in 1996. (Trial Ex. 44) . At that time, the PSC and
the statutes governing the conduct of public utilities ceased to have any jurisdiction over
the Association and its Water System. While the orders of the PSC under Title 54 may
have insulated the Association from the requirements of the Well Lease during the period
that the Association's Water System was a regulated public utility, that protection ceased
when the Water System ceased to be a public utility. Accordingly, a private contract
between the Dansies and the Association allowing the Dansies to transport water through
the Water System would not change the Association's exempt status.
The Association also makes a "catch 22" argument by contending that "if the
Association's Water System serves Dansie customers, it necessarily loses its public

The February 5, 1996 Order, concludes that the water system was "organized as a nonprofit, mutual water company" that "serves some non-members under contract, it does
not offer service to the public at large" and therefore decertified the Association's water
system. R. 001119-1121.
973634 1
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utility status." Br. of Appellee at 31. This argument likewise misses the point. Utah
regulates those public utilities that afford services to the public generally. Companies
that offer their services only to their members or owners are not treated as public utilities,
even if they also provide services on a limited basis under private contracts to other
parties. The Association primarily provides water to its members. Prior to and since
1996, however, the Association has provided water to other individuals under contract,
including residents of adjacent subdivisions and the Bureau of Land Management. The
Well Lease is simply one more private contractual relationship under which the
Association is obligated to transport water belonging to the Dansies.
Correctly applying this analysis, the trial court concluded, "[cjlearly Title 54 does
not apply in this case and the terms of the Well Lease are not prohibited by Title 54.
Although the water system operated as a public utility for a short time, for over twenty
plus years the water system has operated as a private water system that has not served the
public at large. Rather, the Association's water system is limited to its members and the
few non-members under contract." R. at 1892.
The trial court also correctly held that the public policy embodied in Title 54 could
not render the Well Lease invalid, reasoning, "[w]hen the Well Lease was first executed,
the Dansie's well was the only reliable water source available to the Association. The
two private parties negotiated the Well Lease at arms length. The Court would be
assuming a paternalistic role by declaring the Well Lease void as a matter of public
policy embodied in Title 54. Just because the Association previously contracted to give
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more than it now desires to give in the Well Lease does not make the Well Lease void as
a matter of public policy." R. at 1893.
Article XI, section 5(b) of the Utah Constitution likewise has no application. That
section confers upon municipalities the power "[t]o furnish all local public services, to
purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain and operate, or lease public utilities local in
extent and use. . ." The Association's contention that the Well Lease ufacially frustrates"
the policy of safe and efficient management of water resources because the Association
"wants to turn its Water System over to a governmental entity, but cannot do so if the
Well Lease is binding," misses the mark. Br. of Appellee at p. 32. As the trial court
correctly concluded, "The Association does not show that private water systems are
prohibited by the Utah Constitution or statute, therefore, this argument is unsupported
and has no merit." R. at 1892, n.L
C.

The Findings Of The PSC Are Not Relevant To The Enforceability Of
The Well Lease,

The Association's reliance on the 1986 PSC Order for its argument that that the
Well Lease violates public policy is likewise misplaced. In the 1986 Order in question,
the PSC purported to find the Well Lease unenforceable and against public policy. The
Association's argument, however, ignores the limited jurisdiction of the PSC and the
specific ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in this litigation. As the trial court correctly
recognized, "[t]he Utah Supreme Court made it clear that the PSC had authority to
determine what contractual expenses should or should not be passed on to rate payers,
but could not determine the validity or invalidity of contracts, like the Well Lease. The
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findings of the PSC with respect to expenses that may be passed on to the class of
ratepayers that the PSC is charged with protecting operate in a wholly different
environment than the free contractual arena that exists outside the regulation of public
utilities.5' R. at 1894.
As previously and conclusively determined by the Utah Supreme Court, the UPSC
did not have jurisdiction to invalidate the 1977 Well Lease Agreement as long as that
agreement did not impact the rates paid by the Homeowners Association" and "ordinary
contracts unrelated to [its rate making authority] are outside of the purview of the PSC
jurisdiction;' 901 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1996).
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that the PSC had jurisdiction, in the
context of setting rates for public utilities, to determine what contractual expenses should
or should not be passed on to rate payers. The Supreme Court made clear, however, that
the PSC could not reach beyond its rate-making function to determine the validity or
invalidity of contracts. Public utilities have monopoly powers to provide services or
goods to the public. In return, those public utilities are subjected to regulation of the
services and charges they may impose by the PSC in order to prevent abuses of the
monopoly power granted to those utilities. Outside the context of the utilities, however,
the State does not confer such monopoly powers and the presumption is that freedom of
contract will govern the relationship of the parties. Thus, the finding of the PSC with
respect to expenses that may be passed on to the class of rate payers that the PSC is
charged with protecting operate in a wholly different environment than the free
contractual arena that exists outside the regulation of public utilities.
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After hearing and considering all of the evidence presented at trial, the trial court
thus correctly determined that, "the Well Lease involved private parties dealing at arms
length regarding a private water system. The Court will not impose the PSC's policy that
rates by nondiscriminatory on private parties contracting regarding a private water
system." R. at 1895.
D.

This Court Has Already Declined To Find That The Well Lease
Violates Public Policy.

This Court addressed the issue of the enforceability of the Well Lease on grounds
of public policy in its 1996 decision. See Hi-Country Estates v. Bagley & Co., 928 P.2d
1047 (Utah App. 1996). The Association's argument to the contrary is therefore without
merit. The procedural context by which this issue reached this Court is significant to
fully appreciate this Court's comments. In the early 1990s, the trial court found the Well
Lease to be unenforceable based on the PSC's ruling to that effect. That decision was
appealed to this Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision. See Hi-Country Estates
v. Bagley & Co., 863 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1993). That decision, was, in turn, appealed to
the Utah Supreme Court, which held that the PSC had no jurisdiction to determine the
enforceability of the Well Lease, and the Supreme Court then remanded the case back to
this Court. See Hi-Country Estates v. Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1996).
This Court then addressed the question of whether the public policy made the
Well Lease unenforceable in the context of a specific ruling on that issue by the Utah
Supreme Court. Quite to the contrary of the Association's contention, the question of
whether the Well Lease was valid under public policy was thus squarely before this

973634 1

12

Court, which had before it a full record, including the Well Lease and the findings of the
PSC.

In that context, this Court noted that it could make "a legal determination,

independent of the PSC's conclusions, that the terms of the agreement are unreasonable
as applied to the Homeowners Association, and refuse to enforce the agreement on
grounds of public policy." Hi-Country Estates v. Bagley & Co., 928 P.2d 1047, 1052
(Utah Ct App. 1996). This Court, however, declined to do so, and likewise declined to
remand this issue to the trial court for any further determination. Id. This Court's ruling
accordingly constitutes a final finding that the Well Lease does not violate public policy.
E.

The Well Lease Is Binding On The Association As An Assign Or
Sucesssor.

Finally, the Association argues that it is not bound by the terms of the Well Lease
because it is not a "successor or assign" to the Well Lease. Br. of Appellee at pp. 29-30.
The Association, however, never raised this issue below, and therefore failed to preserve
the issue for appeal. Accordingly, the Association has waived this argument, and this
Court should refuse to hear the Association's argument on this point:
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court
has an opportunity to rule on that issue. This requirement
puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows
for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding.
For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the
error (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the
issue must be specifically raised, and (3) the challenging
party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority. Issues that are not raised at trial are usually
deemed waived.
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438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, t 51, 99 P.3d 801 (emphasis added)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Strawberry Elec. Service Dist v.
Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 880 (Utah 1996) (declining to address argument
because it was raised for first time on appeal); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102
("It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties in the trial cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal."). The Association never made any argument, or
presented any factual evidence or legal authority at the trial court that it was not a
successor or assign to the Well Lease, and that it should therefore not be bound by its
terms.

Likewise, the Association has provided this Court with no circumstances, let

alone exceptional circumstances, that would justify the Association's failure to raise this
issue below. Therefore, this Court should disregard the Association's argument about
whether it was a successor or assign.
Even if this Court were to hear the Association's argument, despite their failure to
raise the issue in the trial court, the Association's argument is nonetheless without merit.

J

Tellingly, this issue was not even included in the parties' stipulation of the remaining
issues for trial. Indeed, as the Association has recognized in its brief, the parties
stipulated to what issues would be addressed at trial, including: (1) whether the Well
Lease Agreement is void as against public policy; (2) whether the Dansies agreed to the
chlorination, pumping, testing and transportation costs of transporting their water through
the Associations' water system; (3) if the Dansies did agree, what are the costs of
transporting the water; and (4) what damages did the Dansies sustain because the
Association refused to transport the water. R. 1555-54. Conspicuously absent from this
list is any mention of whether Association is an "assign" or "successor" and whether it
should be bound by the Well Lease if it is not. Certainly the questions of whether the
Well Lease is void as unconscionable or against public policy are very different from the
question of whether the Association is not bound by the Well Lease because it is not a
successor or assign.
973634 1

14

The Well Lease is binding on Bagley's "successors or assigns," and the Association
therefore argues that because it did not succeed to Bagley's interest through "inheritance,
assignment or the like," the Association is not subject to the Well Lease. Br. of Appellee
at pp. 29-30. The Association's sole legal authority for this argument derives from two
cases from this Court, both of which actually contradict the Association's argument. For
example, in Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Co., 888 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994), the plaintiff sold a piece of real property to the defendants on an
installment contract. Thereafter, the defendants assigned their interest in the property to a
third party by quitclaim deed. After the defendants defaulted on the monthly payments,
the plaintiff foreclosed on the property, obtained a judgment, and sold the property to
itself at a sheriffs sale. Id. After failing to collect on the judgment from the defendants,
the plaintiff attempted to collect from the third party, arguing that by accepting the
quitclaim deed from the defendants, the third party assumed the defendants' obligations a
"successor" under the contract. Id. at 663.
This Court held that the third party was not liable for the defendants' obligations
to the plaintiff, finding that while the third party "became a successor to the [defendants']
property interest"' they were not successors to the contract between the [defendants| and
[plaintiff]. Id. (emphasis added). However, this Court noted that a quitclaim deed is a
deed of conveyance that passes whatever title, interest or claim that the grantor has in the
property.

Id.

Therefore, upon accepting the deed, the third party "obtained the

[defendants'] interest in the property subject to any existing encumbrances against that
interest:' Id. (emphasis added). Similarly in West v. Case, 2006 UT App. 325, \ 21, 142
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P.3d 576, this Court found that a party not a signatory to a real estate purchase contract
was not a successor or assign to the contract, but still had an in rem obligation to transfer
the property to the purchasers upon their fulfilling of their obligations under the contract.
These cases therefore demonstrate that although a successor in title to property may not
be a successor to a previous contract, the successor in title still takes the property subject
to all existing encumbrances on the land.
Here, the Association took title to the Water System subject to the Well Lease. In
earlier litigation, this Court affirmed the trial court's decision to quite title to the Water
System in favor of the Association based on a series of quitclaim deeds granting the
parties' respective interests in the water system to the Association.

See Hi-County

Estates v. Bagley, 863 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Upon receiving the property,
the Association therefore took whatever interest in the property the grantors had, "subject
to any existing encumbrances." See Oquirrh, 888 P.2d at 663. The Association thus
cannot receive by quitclaim deed a greater interest than what was held by the grantor.
See id. As discussed herein, this Court has declared the Well Lease to be a valid
encumbrance on the Water System. Because the Water System was encumbered by the
Well Lease at the time the Association took title to the property by way of quitclaim
deed, the Association took the Water System subject to the Well Lease. Accordingly, the
Associations' argument that it is not subject to the lease because it is not a "successor or
assign" is without merit.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING THE DANSIES $16,33499 FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO THE
WATER SYSTEM,
The Association contends that the trial court's reliance on the PSC finding for its

award of $16,334.99 to the Dansies for improvements to the Water System is problematic
because "it is not certain whether the improvements were for the period 1981-1985 and
whether Foothills recovered some or all of the improvements through water rates," Br. of
Appellee at 35. The Association is mistaken, as the evidence clearly demonstrates thai
the trial court acted well within its discretion awarding the Dansies this amount. As
explained by the trial court in its January 5, 2006 Order, "[t]he findings of the Public
Service Commission in its Final Report and Order dated March 17, 1986, constitute the
only credible evidence before the Court regarding the value of improvements to the
Water System between 1981 and 1985." R. at 001756. Accordingly, the trial court
concluded that "Foothills is entitled to recover the sum of $16,334.99 as reimbursement
for improvements to the Water System between 1981 and 1985." Id, at p 5-6. At the
hearing on this matter, the trial court further explained as follows:
The Court has carefully considered the question [of the value
of the improvements between 1981-1985], and it has been
discussed at length over a long, long period of tine involving
a number of settings. And the Court finds that the only
credible evidence on which the Court can make a decision on
the value of the improvements, the only credible admissible
evidence on that issue, is the finding of the Public Service
Commission. And it provides the Court with the best
indication of the value of those improvements on what review
and consideration the Public Service Commission made on
that issue.
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R. at 001866, pp. 51-52 (emphasis added). Such a finding was certainly within the trial's
court discretion and the trial court's award of $16,334.99 in favor of the Dansies should
accordingly be affirmed. See Lysenco v. Sawaya, 1999 UT App. 3 1 , ^ 6 , 973 P.2d 445
("We review the trial court's decision to award damages under a standard which gives the
court considerable discretion, and will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, because the adequacy of a damage award is a factual question, we will not
reverse the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous.") (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted).
III.

THE ASSOCIATION'S RELIANCE ON THE PSC AND THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT FOR ITS ARGUMENT THAT THE WELL LEASE
REQUIRES THE DANSIES TO PAY THEIR PRO RATA
TRANSPORTATION COSTS IS MISPLACED.
The Association's argument that requiring its members to provide the Dansies

with the water and hook-ups as provided in the Well Lease would violate the ruling of the
PSC is irrelevant, as the PSC no longer has jurisdiction over the Water System. Indeed,
the Association does not dispute that because the PSC divested itself of jurisdiction over
the Water System in 1996, its 1986 Order is no longer binding or enforceable on the
water system. Likewise, the Association does not dispute that because the PSC's 1986
Order was the only thing that limited how the courts of Utah have enforced the Well
Lease, and because the 1986 Order is no longer binding, the Well Lease must be enforced
in its entirety. Rather, the Association simply suggests that because of the costs involved
in providing the water and hook-ups, as provided in the Well Lease, those terms should
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not be enforced.

This argument misses the mark, and the trial court's Order should

accordingly be reversed.
The Association also mischaracterizes the Utah Supreme Court's decision in HiCountry II, 901 P.2d at 1023, by stating that "[t]he Supreme Court further held that the
PSC could not invalidate the Well Lease 'as long as that agreement did not impact the
rates paid by the Homeowners Association.'" Br. of Appellee at 35 (quoting Hi-Country
Estates v Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d at 1023). In truth, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In any event, the PSC did not have jurisdiction to invalidate
the 1977 well lease agreement as long as that agreement did
not impact the rates paid by the Homeowners Association.
Although the PSC has power to construe contracts affecting
mattes within its jurisdiction such as rate-making, ordinary
contracts unrelated to such matters are outside the purview of
PSC jurisdiction.
Hi-Country Estates v. Bagley & Co.} 901 P.2d at 1023 (emphasis added). Viewed in the
appropriate context, it is clear that the Utah Supreme Court's language does not never
imposed any condition whatsoever on the validity or enforceability of the Well Lease.4
The initial decision to limit the application of the Well Lease was made not by the
trial court, but by the PSC-which has not had jurisdiction over this matter since February
5, 1996. In contrast, both this Court and the Supreme Court'have ruled that the Well
Lease is a valid and binding encumbrance on the water system.

4

For this same reason, the Association's discussion of the amount that it costs the
Association to produce and transport water through the water system is irrelevant, as the
PSC's Order is no longer valid or binding.
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A.

Enforcing The Terms of The Well Lease Would Not Subject The
Water System To The Jurisdiction Of The PSC

Reversing that portion of the trial court's order requiring the Dansie's to pay their
pro rata share of the transportation costs would not subject the Association to PSC
regulation as a public utility, despite the Association's argument to the contrary. As
expressly acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he PSC has only the rights and
powers granted to it by statute." Hi-Country Estates v. Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d at 1021.
Thus, the PSC's authority is limited to exercising jurisdiction over "public utilities," i.e.,
utilities that serve the public. Utah Code Ann. § § 54-2-l(15).5 Section 54-2-1(15) of the
Utah Code expressly defines a "public utility" as, among other entities, a "water
corporation ... where the service is performed for, or the commodity is delivered to, the

5

The Association cites to section 24-2-1 (26) & (27) of the Utah Code in support of its
argument that supplying water to the Dansies in accordance with the Well Lease would
remove it from statutory exemption. Section 24-2 of the Utah Code is nonexistent, and
the Dansies assume that the Association is instead relying on section 54, as set forth
above. Even with this assumption, the Association's argument must fail. Subsections 26
of section 24-2-1 defines transportation of property to include:
Every service in connection with or incidental to the transportation of
property, including in particular its receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer,
switching, carriage, ventilation, refrigeration, icing, dunnage, storage, and
hauling, and the transmission of credit by express companies.
Subsection 27 of section 24-2-1 likewise defines "water corporation" to include:
Every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning,
controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public service
within this state. It does not include private irrigation companies engaged
in distributing water only to their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties,
water conservancy districts, improvement districts, or other governmental
units created or organized under any genera or special law of this state.
Neither of these provisions discuss whether the Association qualifies for
exemption as a public utility.
973634 I

20

public generally ..." In decertifying the Association as a public utility on Feb 5, 1996,
the PSC specifically found that the Association (1) "is organized as a nonprofit
corporation providing service to its members," and (2) "serves a limited number of
nonmembers pursuant to specific contracts; however it does not offer its service to the
public generally." R. at 001119-1120. Thus, as explained in detail in the Dansies'
Opening Brief, the 1986 PSC Order is no longer applicable. Furthermore, adding the
Dansies to the Association's list of water-users but enforcing the terms of the Water
Lease would simply add the Dansies to the "limited number of nonmembers pursuant to
specific contracts" recognized by the PSC, and therefore would not remove the
Association from exemption of its jurisdiction.
B.

Requiring The Association To Provide Water To The Dansies In
Accordance With The Terms Of The Well Lease Does Not Conflict
With Section 746-331-l.C Of The Utah Administrative Code,

The Association's reliance on section 746-331-1C of the Utah Administrative
Code is likewise misplaced.6 This regulation was adopted on April 6, 1998. The PSC

6

This regulation provides as follows:
If, on the basis of the information elicited, the Commission finds that the
entity is an existing non-profit corporation, in good standing with the
Division of Corporation; that the entity owns or otherwise adequately
controls the assets necessary to furnish culinary water service to its
members, including water sources and plants; and that voting control of the
entity is distributed in a way that each member enjoys a complete
commonality of interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would be
superfluous, then the Commission shall issue its finding that the entity is
exempt from Commission jurisdiction and the proceeding shall end.
Issuance of the findings shall not preclude another Commission inquiry at a
later time if changed circumstances or later-discovered facts warrant
another inquiry.
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therefore could not have relied on any portion of this regulation when it decertified the
Association as a public utility in 1996 and therefore irrelevant to this issue. See Roark v.
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995) ("It is a long-standing rule of statutory
construction that a legislative enactment which alters the substantive law or affects vested
rights will not be read to operate retrospectively unless the legislature has clearly
expressed that intention."); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988) (same).
Moreover, even if relevant, and without citation to any support, the Association
seems to suggest that it would lose its exemption because the Association does not own
or control the assets necessary to furnish culinary water service to Dansies, and that the
Dansies are neither member of the Association nor do they share a commonality of
interest with all other customers of the system.

Br. of Appellee at p. 38.

These

contentions grossly misstate the language of Regulation 746-331-1C. The Association
owns title to the Water System, which certainly includes the "assets necessary" to furnish
water to the Dansies. Furthermore, nowhere does Regulation 746-331-1C require the
Association to provide service exclusively to its members. Rather, the requirement is
simply that the voting control of the entity be "distributed in a way that each member
enjoys a complete commonality of interest. . . ." Simply because the Dansies are not
members of the Association does not trigger the PSC's jurisdiction.
Regulation 746-331-1.C simply has no bearing on this issue.

Utah Admin. Code. R. 746-331-l.C.
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Accordingly,

IV.

THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DETERMINING THAT THE ASSOCIATION DID NOT BREACH THE
WELL LEASE AND THEREFORE SUFFERED NO DAMAGES.
A.

The Record Does Not Support The Trial Court's Conclusion That The
Dansies Made No Offer To Pay Transportation Costs.

The Association's argument that there exists "ample evidence" to support the trial
court's finding that the Dansies never offered to pay pro rata transportation costs is
contrary to the record.7 The Association does not dispute thai Rodney Dansie had several
conversations with the Association whereby he offered to pay costs associated with reconnecting the water system and transporting the water to the Dansies, The Association
consistently responded to Rodney Dansie's offers by unequivocally informing him that
"absolutely, under no condition would I be reconnected to that water system ever." Tr.
at 431:4-21 (Tyler); 120:19-122:2 & 187:6-189:21 (Rodney Dansie).8
In addition, Richard Dansie testified that after the Association disconnected the
water lines, he attended a meeting with the Association members whereby "I explained
my situation, that I needed to be hooked on to the water. I needed water and I was
willing to pay whatever it took, whatever the cost was to get me water. And I indicated
that, you know, the lines were there, I had meters in place. And they said they couldn't

In addition, the Association is mistaken that the Dansies failed to adequately marshal
the evidence. As set forth in their Opening Brief, the Dansies cited to the trial testimony
of Deborah Watson and Joe Totorica, the two witnesses who testified at trial that the
Dansies did not offer to pay transportation costs.
8

In fact, Rodney Dansie testified that he had conversations with Ken Norton, Daryl
Wooly, Craig Winger, Deborah Watson, Joe Totorica and Merrill Jensen, all directors of
the Association, whereby Mr. Dansie offered to pay all the costs associated with
transporting the water through the water system. The Association flatly rejected these
numerous offers. Tr. at 187:6-189:25 (Rodney Dansie).
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help me." Tr. at 478:16-21 (Richard Dansie). . When asked why he offered to pay
whatever cost was necessary when the Well Lease provided for water at no charge,
Richard Dansie explained, "I just needed water. .. . But I needed water then and so I was
willing to pay whatever cost would be to get me some water so I didn't have to cancel
parties." Tr. at 479: 20-24 (Richard Dansie).
Finally, the Association's attempt to discredit the testimony of Steve Maxfield
because he did not testify that Rodney Dansie offered to pay the Association for
transportation costs is unavailing. Mr. Maxfield testified that he attended a meeting with
Rodney Dansie at the Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District, which was also
attended by Association members Deborah Watson and Joe Totorica, both of whom
testified that the Dansies never made any offer to pay for the water. Tr. at 1202:71203:3; 1218:1-16 (Watson) & 1368:18-1369:8 (Joe Totorica). During this meeting, Mr.
Maxfield, an unbiased witness, testified that Rodney Dansie offered to pay the costs
associated with hooking him back up to the water system. The Association's response
was simple: "no way, period." Tr. at 564:1-565:19 (Maxfield).

The Association's

response would have certainly been the same regardless of whether Rodney Dansie
offered to pay transportation costs. The evidence presented to the trial court therefore
supports the conclusion that the Association never had any intention to transport water to
the Dansies as required under the Well Lease, and likewise ignored or flatly refused all of
the Dansie's multiple offers to pay to reconnect the water lines. The trial courfs finding
that the Dansies made no such offer is therefore not supported by the record.
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B.

The Record Does Not Support The Trial Court's Decision Denying The
Dansies' Claim For Damages,

As explained in detail in the Dansies' Opening Brief, immediately upon assuming
control of the Water System, the Association severed the Dansies' connection to that
Water System and renounced any obligations under the Well Lease. At that time, the
trial court had already held that the Well Lease was a valid and binding encumbrance on
the Water System and that finding was still under appeal. As a result of the Association's
actions in defiance of the trial court's ruling, the Dansies were forced to construct a
temporary water system. Likewise, the Dansies were unable to develop and market their
property, and suffered damage to their landscaping and fruit trees. The Association's
argument that the Dansies' damages were "self-inflicted" is contrary to this evidence.
First, the Dansies mitigated their damages by constructing a temporary water system. In
fact, had the Dansies' not expended the effort and expense to construct this water system,
their damages would certainly have increased exponentially. Second, it was certainly
reasonably foreseeable at the time the Well Lease was executed that the Dansies would
suffer damages should the Dansies be disconnected from the water system. Indeed, the
purpose of the amendment to the Well Lease was to ensure that the Dansies had an
adequate water supply. The Association's argument to the contrary is therefore without
merit.
Third, the Dansies have not changed their damages theories. Quite to the contrary,
the Dansies have consistently maintained (1) that because the Well Lease requires the
Association to provide up to 12 million gallons of water to the Dansies per year at no
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cost, the Association breached the Well Lease by disconnecting and severing the water
lines; and (2) that as a direct and proximate result of the Association's actions, the
Dansies have suffered damages. This is the theory that was presented at trial. Although
certain of the damage calculations may have changed as new evidence was brought to
light, the theory has remained consistent.
Finally, an alternative water supply was not available to the Dansies. Not only did
the Association flatly refuse each of the Dansies' offer to pay to restore water service, but
there existed no other source from which the Dansies could draw water. The Dansies
could not physically divert water through Lot 9 because no line existed to distribute that
water. The Dansie irrigation wells that were scattered across the Dansie property were at
elevations where they could not provide service to the Dansie residences and no lines
existed to provide such service even if the wells had the capacity to provide water.
Tr. at 105:14-106:21, 115:1-16, 117:3-17, 120:19-122:4, 127:9-128:15 (Rodney Dansie).
Rather, the Dansies could secure water service only when they constructed a new
temporary water system. Indeed, the fact of the loss of water service to the Dansie
property is evidenced by the Dansie complaints to the PSC regarding termination of
service, contemporaneous entries in Rodney Dansies5 day timer (Trial Ex. 48), the
expenses the Dansies incurred in constructing a temporary water system, and Richard
Dansies' plea to the Association to restore water service to him, on any conditions. On
the basis of this evidence, the trial court clearly erred in concluding that the Dansies did
not suffer any damages.
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V.

THE ASSOCIATION IS LIABLE FOR THE DANSIES' ATTORNEYS'
FEES.
The Association mistakenly contends that it is not liable for the Dansies' attorneys

fc^s, as set forth in the Well Lease, because it was not a successor or assign to the Well
Lease. As explained above, however, this Court has already determined that the Well
Lease is a valid and binding encumbrance on the Water System.

The Well Lease

provides that successors to Bagley are liable for attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing
rights under the Well Lease. For twenty years now, the Association has received the
benefits of the Well Lease, and is now Bagley's successor in the operation of the Water
System. In fact, it was the Association that severed the Water System, depriving the
Dansies of their rights to receive water under the Well Lease.

Such action clearly

demonstrates that the Association is liable for the Dansies' attorneys' fees incurred both
at the trial court and on appeal.
VI.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Dansies respectfully request that this Court

enter an Order affirming trial court's Order holding that Well Lease is neither
unconscionable nor violative of any public policy, as well as the trial court's judgment of
$16,334.99 in favor of the Dansies. In addition, the Dansies respectfully request that this
Court likewise reverse the Order of the trial court, and holding that (1) the Dansies are
entitled to the full benefit of the Well Lease, including, at no charge, up to twelve million
gallons of water per year and up to fifty connections; (2) by severing the two water
systems, the Association breached its obligations pursuant to the Well Lease, causing the
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Dansies to sustain damages established at trial; and (3) the Dansies are entitled to an
award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred both at the trial court and on appeal.
DATED this ?/

si

day of June, 2007.
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
^_

RAYMOND T. ETCHEVERRY
ANGfeNELSON
Attorneys for Appellants
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